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This legal article/report forms part of my ongoing legal commentary on the use of artificial intelligence within the justice system. It supports my work in teaching, lecturing, and writing about AI and the law and is published to promote my practice. Not legal advice. Not Direct/Public Access. All instructions via clerks at Doughty Street Chambers. This legal article concerns UK hallucinated citations (both AI and non-AI fabricated/false citations)
Introduction
I have quite a lot to write up, so thank you for bearing with me. This post forms part of a series of legal articles to be published over the next few days, reflecting a number of recent developments in AI and the law.
In this article, I draw together a number of hallucinated citations cases (both AI and non-AI fabricated/false citations) drawn from the AI hallucination case tracker together with some more recent cases that have come to light.
I should flag one point about how cases are presented. I will continue to write about cases as and when I become aware of them, rather than in strict chronological order. The tracker itself, however, is organised by reference to the date of judgment. As a result, the ordering of cases within the tracker will continue to change as earlier judgments are identified and logged. This means that a case described as, for example, the tenth or eleventh item in an earlier article may appear in a different position in the tracker below. This reflects an evolving ordering rather than any change in the underlying cases.
The article concludes by turning to a particularly significant decision of the Court of Appeal which is likely the first time an AI hallucination in this context has been considered at that level.
Appeal in the cause of Jennings v Natwest Group Plc (Sheriff Appeal Court Civil)
[2025] SACCIV 41 (21 November 2025)
This case concerned the Equality Act 2010 and the full facts can be read here on Bailii. At paragraph 10, the court considered the appellant’s appeal submissions and noted:
“[10] These require caution, the appellant having made submissions using ChatGPT, an artificial-intelligence database (see appellant’s supplementary submission). That may explain the generality of the submissions, which largely comprise free-form legal propositions with only limited link to the facts. It has served to complicate and obscure the true analysis of the issues. At least three of the cases cited appear to be non-existent.”
The appellant’s motion to amend the pleadings and the appeal itself was refused, but it is not clear from the judgment how far the AI contributed to that final outcome, if at all.
Wemimo Mercy Taiwo v Homelets of Bath Limited & Ors
[2025] EWHC 3173 (KB) (3 December 2025)
This was an oral renewal of an application for permission to appeal from the decision of His Honour Judge Blohm KC, who had dismissed the claim pursuant to section 57 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. From paragraph 22 onwards, the court set out the background to attendance at the hearing, the skeleton arguments, and the position on representation. A particular feature emerged at paragraph 25 in relation to a litigation friend (“LF”), now added as an additional party.
“In the week leading up to the hearing on 24 November 2025, the existence (or non-existence) of one particular authority in the 27 March Submission was questioned by the Court. The Court asked that a copy of the authority be provided by the Applicant. None was provided. It was, in fact, a bogus authority, no doubt falsely created by AI. There are now a number of judgments in which the presentation of false authorities to Court has, unsurprisingly, been deprecated…”
A witness statement was subsequently filed explaining the circumstances and asserting that the authority could not be obtained. The Judge rejected that account, stating:
“I reject this evidence as wholly untrue. The suggestion that [LF] in fact stepped away from the litigation or was not involved in the 27 March Submission is risible. As Bourne J observed before me (at paragraph 18(e) of the reasons for his Order), it is obvious that at all times, [LF] has exercised close control over this claim. Contrary to the assertion in his witness statement, it is plain that [LF] was as much in control (whether with the help of unidentified lawyers, or AI, or both) of the 27 March Submission, containing at least one false citation, as he has been for all other documents and applications submitted in the name of the Applicant…”
The Judge went on to identify further difficulties with the explanation provided, before addressing the purported authority itself and observing:
“…This case does not exist (albeit the bogus reference can be ‘recreated’ through Google’s AI Overview function). There is a 2016 case in the Bolton County Court between the two named parties, but there was no appeal in 2018 to the Court of Appeal and [redacted] is a false reference…”
The judgment then turned to the guidance in Ayinde v Haringey LBC, with the Judge stating:
“The reliance upon false citations is just as unsatisfactory when presented to the Court by a litigant in person (or Litigation Friend), although of course the sanction for having done so may not necessarily be the same as those applicable if a registered lawyer is responsible for the submission. I make clear that where (as seems at least possible here) the citation was included in a document authored or reviewed by a lawyer, without attribution, whether for reward or pro-bono, for use by the litigant in person, that lawyer may, upon identification, be subject to a reference for misconduct or potential contempt (see R (on the application of Ayinde) v Haringey LBC [2025] HLR 38).”
The court considered none of the grounds were reasonably arguable. Following that, the Respondent sought an order for costs on an indemnity basis, which the Applicant opposed. The court considered CPR PD 52B, which governs the circumstances in which a Respondent may recover costs for attending a permission hearing and addressed whether this was an appropriate case for such an order.
“Although I have found that none of the grounds were reasonably arguable, this does not of itself equate to hopelessness for obvious reasons: if it were otherwise, costs would regularly be awarded in the respondent’s favour upon attendance at an oral renewal, when such an order is the exception rather than the rule. However, I have found that a number of the grounds were not just not reasonably arguable, but hopeless. They have also been persisted with in a manner which I have described above as demonstrating a complete lack of discipline, leading to the imposition of a limited CRO. The numerous iterations of documents and applications in the pursuit of the appeal, and its oral renewal, together with the citation of false authorities have all undoubtedly added to the burden on the Court and the Respondent.
I regard it as in the interests of justice that the Applicant’s approach is marked with a costs order against her. However, taking account of the fact that not all the points taken were ‘hopeless’, I consider the appropriate balance is that the Applicant is to pay 75% of the reasonable costs incurred by the Respondent, to be assessed on a standard basis if not agreed, from the date of Sheldon J’s order refusing permission on the papers (including any costs dealing with the CRO). There shall be an interim payment of £7,500 on account.”
Hassan v ABC International Bank PLC
Case Number: 6005897/2024 (13 October 2025)
This was an employment tribunal claim. There is a detailed procedural history, which can be read at the link above. For present purposes, the relevant part of the judgment concerned costs, with a detailed analysis set out in Annex A. As the Judge explained:
“Following the preliminary hearing of 6 June 2025, I indicated my finding that the Claimant had engaged in unreasonable conduct and that the threshold for mandatory consideration of a costs order against him had been reached under rule 74(2)(a). The reasons underpinning that finding are set out in Annex A and have previously been sent to the parties.”
Annex A contained a detailed analysis and was titled ” Annex A Errant case citation, unreasonable conduct and costs” The Judge explained:
“The Claimant cited case law derived from using AI as a legal research tool in both his AAv2 and in his skeleton. The Respondent has criticised the resulting outputs as amounting to scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious conduct. The Respondent also intimated a claim for costs.”
At paragraph 41, the Judge addressed the use of AI more generally:
“On the use of AI in general, I happily accept that the internet is a resource many of us tend to rely on as providing expertise and knowledge where we lack it. Indeed, the facility for using a search engine has even been relied on in the EAT a reason for not granting an extension of time. I accept that AI is now at the forefront of internet searches. It might also be said that more intelligent and proficient users of the internet, like the Claimant, are more apt to use it in the way that the Claimant has i.e. to help construct arguments. I should not, and do not, approach the Claimant’s use of AI as in any way inherently negative”
The Judge then set out the Guidance for Judicial Office Holders on Artificial Intelligence (14 April 2025). Readers of this blog will know this was updated recently here. The Judge then had regard to several hallucination authorities and commented upon their relevant to this case:
“44.Ayinde v London Borough of Harringey and others [2025] EWHC 1383 is a case which acknowledges the important role of AI in the conduct of litigation but stresses the risks that it carries. It is, however, concerned chiefly with the responsibilities of those in regulated legal professions who come before the Court. Specifically, it is noted “the administration of justice depends upon the court being able to rely without question on the integrity of those who appear before it” [Dame Victoria Sharp at paragraphs 5]. The single lay person identified as having advanced fake cases was accepted not to have any intention to mislead and to have had complete confidence in the authenticity of the material he advanced
(paragraphs 76 and 79).
45.Harber v HMRC [2023] UKFTT 1007. Harber is not on point because (paragraph 22 refers) Ms Harber was found expressly to be unaware that the cases in her response were fabricated. From the time of the service of the Respondent’s skeleton, the Claimant knew there was a substantial risk he was advancing unreliable case law.
46.Bandla v SRA [2025] EWHC 1167 (Admin) . This was a case where, as a result of citing fake cases, grounds of appeal were struck out as an abuse of process. A material finding was that the Appellant was someone who was a previously practising solicitor and had never withdrawn the citations. There is a clear difference with the Claimant here who I would
47.Zzaman v Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2025] UKFTT 00539. This was a case in which the litigant in person advancing fake cases was found to be “straightforward”, that it was “logical
and reasonable to use AI”. That is not the position I have found applied when the Claimant served his skeleton and amended skeleton.
48.Olsen v Finansiel Stabilitet A/S [2025] EWHC 42(KB). This is a case where the Court narrowly came to conclude that a summons for contempt would not be appropriate where a suspicion was raised that the Appellants had knowingly advanced a fake case. However, it was found the Appellant’s right to recover costs (to which they were provisionally entitled) was potentially impaired by their conduct. The case is recent. I have not been able to establish whether costs were agreed between the parties or the Court has acted upon the indication it gave. This seems to me to be nearer to the Claimant’s situation with the distinction of reckless disregard….for authenticity rather than knowledge of falsity.”
Having reviewed the authorities, the court went on to make a costs order. At paragraph 50, the Judge stated:
“50.Having regard to Holden I do not consider this is simply a case of lost objectivity and poor knowledge of the law. It is quite distinct. The majority of the Supreme Court in Barton held a litigant’s lack of representation will often justify making allowances but will not usually justify applying to litigants in person a lower standard of compliance with rules or orders of the Court. The Claimant here went outside of my clear direction by resubmitting the amended skeleton. There was no order in respect of the content of the first skeleton but for the reasons I have given, the service of a document replete with so many dangerously misleading references was, given the history, unreasonable.”
133 Blackstock Road (Hackney) RTM Company Limited v Assethold Limited
LON/00AM/LSC/2025/0945 (17 November 2025)
This was an application by the applicant RTM company seeking a determination of the amount of service charges payable to the respondent. In its statement of case, the respondent cited a number of authorities and principles of law which the Tribunal, constituted by Judge Latham, was unable to locate. Judge Latham was concerned that the respondent had relied upon one citation which did not exist and two further decisions which were not authorities for the propositions advanced. The Respondent was therefore directed to file a statement addressing those concerns. In default of compliance, the Respondent would be debarred from defending the application.
At paragraph 14, the Tribunal recorded:
“14.The Respondent has failed to comply with Judge Latham’s Direction. The Tribunal therefore debars it from defending this application. In consequence, pursuant to rule 9(8) of the Tribunal Rules, the Tribunal is
entitled to and does go on to determine this matter summarily without consideration of the Respondent’s response.
15. Even had that not been the case, it would be impossible for the Tribunal to give any weight to the Respondent’s submissions given its failure to provide the legal authorities in support of its submissions. Having regard to the Respondent’s conduct in this matter, the Tribunal is satisfied either that such authorities do not exist, or (where they exist) they do not support the principles said to be derived from them.
16. The Tribunal therefore has no hesitation in accepting the Applicant’s submission that any obligation to insure the Property passed to the Applicant……”
When turning to the question of the refund of fees and associated orders, the Tribunal stated:
“19.The Tribunal is extremely concerned that the Respondent has put material before it that is erroneous. [redacted] has failed to give any explanation as to how this error arose. One explanation might
be the use of an AI LLM in the production of the Respondent’s statement of case.
20. The Tribunal is normally a no costs jurisdiction. However, the Tribunal is satisfied that this is a case in which the Respondent should show cause why it should not be made subject to an order to pay the Applicant’s costs under rule 13(1)(b), given the conduct recorded above. The Tribunal is entitled to make such un order on its own initiative pursuant to rule 13(3) of the Tribunal Rules.
21. The Tribunal has had regard to the decision of the President of the King’s Bench Division in R (Frederick Ayinde) v Haringey LBC [2025] EWHC 1383 (Admin). While [redacted] does not represent the Respondent as a Solicitor, he is nevertheless regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (“SRA”) and continues to have duties in accordance with that professional code of conduct outside of specific litigation, in particular to comply with the SRA Principle 2: to act in a way that upholds public trust
and confidence in the profession even if not conducting litigation in a professional capacity.”
This matter appears to be ongoing. The Tribunal made further directions requiring an explanation for the mis-citation and ordered the attendance of the individual concerned at a hearing listed for two hours on 27 January 2026.
D (A Child) (Recusal)
[2025] EWCA Civ 1570 (9 December 2025)
This case is significant, as it appears to be the first occasion on which the Court of Appeal has expressly addressed the issue of hallucinations in the context of legal argument. The judgment concerns three linked appeals arising in unusual circumstances in proceedings under the Children Act 1989. The proceedings involved applications for child arrangements and other orders relating to a child. The parties to the proceedings were the child’s parents.
At paragraph 28, the court recorded concerns arising from a document prepared by the mother:
“The document included a number of citations of reported cases. Some citations were correct and appropriate. As subsequently pointed out by the father’s counsel at the hearing before us, however, other cases cited were not authority for the propositions for which they were advanced and, in some instances, did not exist at all. At the hearing before us, the mother accepted that she has used artificial intelligence to assist her in preparing the document.”
A further issue arose at paragraph 54 in relation to a later skeleton argument filed by the mother, acting in person:
“…The skeleton argument cited a number of authorities. As before, some citations were non-existent cases – for example [the court set an example] “Re M (Paternity: Appeal by Mother) [2003] EWHC 2832 (Fam)”. Other cases were cited in support of a proposition for which they were not authority. For example, Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35, the well-known decision of the House of Lords on the standard of proof in children’s cases, was erroneously cited for the proposition that [false proposition] . Re W (Children) [2010] UKSC 12, the equally well-known decision on the principles which should guide the exercise of the court’s discretion in deciding whether to order a child to attend to give evidence in family proceedings, was cited for the proposition that [false proposition].
In a final passage addressing this issue, the court stated:
“Finally, I return to the issue raised by the father’s representatives about the mother’s erroneous citation of authority (see in particular paragraph 54 above). I absolve the mother of any intention to mislead the court. Litigants in person are in a difficult position putting forward legal arguments. It is entirely understandable that they should resort to artificial intelligence for help. Used properly and responsibly, artificial intelligence can be of assistance to litigants and lawyers when preparing cases. But it is not an authoritative or infallible body of legal knowledge. There are a growing number of reports of “hallucinations” infecting legal arguments through the citation of cases for propositions for which they are not authority and, in some instances, the citation of cases that do not exist at all. At worst, this may lead to the other parties and the court being misled. In any event, it means that extra time is taken and costs are incurred in cross-checking and correcting the errors. All parties – represented and unrepresented – owe a duty to the court to ensure that cases cited in legal argument are genuine and provide authority for the proposition advanced.”
S Peggie v Fife Health Board and Dr B Upton
4104864/2024 (8 December 2025 updated 11 December 2025)
This case warrants a dedicated article and a more detailed analysis of errors/corrections in judgments. I am still trying to understand exactly what happened and will update shortly.
Comment
There are several interesting features of the above hallucinated citations cases, which I will just briefly address before finalising this already quite detailed legal article.
First, in Jennings v NatWest, the description of ChatGPT as an “artificial intelligence database” is notable. It is not clear that this is an entirely accurate characterisation of what ChatGPT is or how it functions, but it is nonetheless interesting to see the court reaching for familiar analogies in order to situate new technology within an existing conceptual framework. Readers of my legal articles may recall earlier references likening ChatGPT to an “internet search history” (some interesting views on that point can be read here and here). It will be interesting to see whether such comparisons continue to be relied upon over time, or whether more nuanced distinctions begin to emerge as judicial familiarity with these tools increases.
Secondly, the judgment in Hassan v ABC International Bank PLC provides a clear illustration of how courts are already drawing on emerging case law to articulate principled responses to a developing issue. The tribunal’s careful engagement with earlier authorities demonstrates an attempt to locate the present problem within an evolving body of judicial reasoning, rather than treating it as an isolated or novel difficulty. This comparative, principle based approach was the original motivation behind my AI hallucination case tracker, which seeks to identify common judicial responses across jurisdictions and to understand how courts may continue to respond to this issue as it becomes more prevalent. More on the tracker later.
Thirdly, the Court of Appeal’s decision in D (A Child) (Recusal) is particularly significant. The court’s observations reflect a careful and balanced approach, recognising both the practical realities faced by litigants in person and the genuine utility of artificial intelligence when used appropriately.
Fourthly, courts and tribunals in the UK, unlike those in Australia and parts of the United States, still appear more inclined to record the full hallucinated citations and the false legal principle that has been relied upon. As I often discuss, this is problematic. Judges acting in good faith may inadvertently be making the situation worse because these hallucinated citations are then integrated indirectly into the established legal canon. My article for Bar Counsel Magazine explores the issue in more detail.
Some of you will know that I maintain a private database of AI hallucinations, false citations and invented principles that have appeared in cases internationally. I keep this database private because I am concerned that, if it were publicly searchable, search engines and AI tools would begin to republish the false information and give it unintended legitimacy simply through repetition. If any of you wish to see this research please contact my clerks.
I have included below a section from my global hallucination tracker (AI and non‑AI hallucinated citations) that focuses solely on the UK position. I would be very grateful if readers who are aware of further cases not yet listed could share them with me, so that I can keep the tracker as accurate and up to date as possible. There is more analysis to follow shortly. If you find these articles helpful, please consider subscribing below.
Final Words from Chat GPT 5.2 Pro and Gemini 3 Pro
This is where I invite premium AI models to comment on or critique the preceding discussion. The below are the interesting aspects of each response.
Chat GPT:
“Substantively, the article is persuasive as an evidence-backed warning that false authorities are no longer exotic edge cases and that UK courts are already developing a consistent judicial posture: AI can assist; it cannot be trusted as authority; everyone remains responsible for accuracy. Its main weakness is not doctrinal; it is analytic”
Gemini:
“AI can simulate legal fluency while failing the rigorous test of truth.“
UK AI and Non‑AI fabricated/false Citations So Far
The full international AI and non‑AI fabricated/false citations tracker can be here, the below is just a summary of the UK AI and non‑AI fabricated/false citations. The section below provides only a summary of the UK cases involving AI and non AI fabricated or false citations. You can click on each case name to read my detailed discussion of it on this blog, and from there you can use the hyperlinks to obtain the full judgment. The table will update automatically as the main tracker is expanded, even if the surrounding blog text remains unchanged over time.
| No | Date | Case | Judicial Quote |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 29-May-2023 | TBC (Lawgazette note) | The Gazette understands that the following day, the LiP returned to court with four case citations, each backing the point they were trying to make. On closer inspection by the barrister, it transpired that one case name had simply been fabricated, while the other three were real case names but with the relevant cited passages being completely different to the judgment in each. For all four citations, the paragraphs quoted were completely fictitious, though appearing completely legitimate. |
| 2 | 4-Dec-2023 | Harber v HMRC | “But that does not mean that citing invented judgments is harmless. It causes the Tribunal and HMRC to waste time and public money, and this reduces the resources available to progress the cases of other court users who are waiting for their appeals to be determined. As Judge Kastel said, the practice also "promotes cynicism" about judicial precedents, and this is important, because the use of precedent is "a cornerstone of our legal system" and "an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases" |
| 3 | 06-Dec-2024 | Crypto Open Patent Alliance v Dr. Craig Steven Wright | “…referred to a series of authorities in support of arguments that reasonable adjustments should be made to enable a vulnerable litigant or witness to participate fairly in court proceedings. As COPA pointed High Court Approved Judgment COPA v Wright Contempt CMC Page 6 out by reference to a series of examples, most of the authorities he has cited do not contain the passages attributed to them (or anything like those passages), and indeed most have nothing to do with adjustments for vulnerable witnesses. COPA suggested that it seems likely that they are AI “hallucinations” by ChatGPT (i.e. made-up references) rather than deliberately misleading inventions by Dr Wright. However, since the principles are clear and not in doubt, as set out above, it is not necessary to engage with his false citations any further.” |
| 4 | 7-Jan-2025 | Ms (Bangladesh) v SoS for Home Department | 13. We sought clarification regarding this citation and reference and asked for the relevant paragraph of the judgment being relied on. [counsel] was not able to specify this. [counsel] submitted that he understood, having used ChatGBT, that the Court of Appeal in Y (China) [2010] EWCA Civ 116 was presided by Pill LJ, LJ Sullivan LJ and Sir Paul Kennedy. However, the citation [2010] EWCA Civ 116 did not point to the case of Y (China) but to R (on the application of YH) v SSHD. We raised concern about this and referred [counsel] to the recent decision of the President of King’s Bench Division in Ayinde [2025] EWHC 1383 (Admin) on the use of Artificial Intelligence and fictitious cases, and directed him to make separate representations in writing.14. In his subsequent written representations, [counsel] clarified that Y(China) was a typological error and he sought to rely on R (on the application of YH) v SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 116 where, when discussing the meaning of ‘anxious scrutiny’ in asylum claims…” |
| 5 | 25-Jan-2025 | Olsen v Finansiel Stabilitet | "I have narrowly and somewhat reluctantly come to the conclusion that I shouldnot cause a summons for contempt of court to be issued to the appellants underCPR rule 81.6. I do not think it likely that a judge (whether myself or anotherjudge) could be sure, to the criminal standard of proof, that the appellants knewthe case summary was a fake. They may have known but they could not becompelled to answer questions about the identity of the person who supplied it."Mr Justice Kerr |
| 6 | 3-Apr-2025 | Bandla v SRA | “I asked the Appellant why, in the light of this citation of non-existent authorities, the Court should not of its own motion strike out the grounds of appeal in this case, as being an abuse of the process of the Court. His answer was as follows. He claimed that the substance of the points which were being put forward in the grounds of appeal were sound, even if the authority which was being cited for those points did not exist. He was saying, on that basis, that the citation of non-existent (fake) authorities would not be a sufficient basis to concern the Court, at least to the extent of taking that course. I was wholly unpersuaded by that answer. In my judgment, the Court needs to take decisive action to protect the integrity of its processes against any citation of fake authority. There have been multiple examples of fake authorities cited by the Appellant to the Court, in these proceedings. They are non-existent cases. Here, moreover, they have been put forward by someone who was previously a practising solicitor. The citations were included, and maintained, in formal documents before the Court. They were never withdrawn. They were never explained. That, notwithstanding that they were pointed out by the SRA, well ahead of this hearing. This, in my judgment, constitutes a set of circumstances in which I should exercise – and so I will exercise – the power of the Court to strike out the grounds of appeal in this case as an abuse of process.” |
| 7 | 3-Apr-2025 | ZZaman v Revenue & Customs | 29. However, our conclusion was that Mr Zzaman's statement of case, written with the assistance of AI, did not provide grounds for allowing his appeal. Although some of the case citations in Mr Zzaman's statement were inaccurate, the use of AI did not appear to have led to the citing of fictitious cases (in contrast to what had happened in Felicity Harber v HMRC [2023] UKFTT 1007 (TC) ). But our conclusion was that the cases cited did not provide authority for the propositions that were advanced. This highlights the dangers of reliance on AI tools without human checks to confirm that assertions the tool is generating are accurate. Litigants using AI tools for legal research would be well advised to check carefully what it produces and any authorities that are referenced. These tools may not have access to the authorities required to produce an accurate answer, may not fully "understand" what is being asked or may miss relevant materials. When this happens, AI tools may produce an answer that seems plausible, but which is not accurate. These tools may create fake authorities (as seemed to be the case in Harber ) or use the names of cases to which it does have access but which are not relevant to the answer being sought (as was the case in this appeal). There is no reliable way to stop this, but the dangers can be reduced by the use of clear prompts, asking the tool to cite specific paragraphs of authorities (so that it is easy to check if the paragraphs support the argument advanced), checking to see the tool has access to live internet data, asking the tool not to provide an answer if it is not sure and asking the tool for information on the shortcomings of the case being advanced. Otherwise there is a significant danger that the use of an AI tool may lead to material being put before the court that serves no one well, since it raises the expectations of litigants and wastes the court's time and that of opposing parties. |
| 8 | 22-Apr-2025 | Goshen v Accuro (2304373/2024) | "...I cannot find such a case, and I am left wondering whether this case is aninvention by the claimant or perhaps an artificial intelligence platform. As I explainedin the hearing, I cannot apply authority which I have not seen. " |
| 9 | 25-Apr-2025 | A County Court case refered to at para 55 of the Ayinde v LBB judgment before HHJ Holmes | “That was a case before the County Court … That counsel drew attention to the fact that the application before the judge contained false material: specifically the grounds of appeal and the skeleton argument settled … contained references to a number of cases that do not exist….” |
| 10 | 6-Jun-2025 | Alharoun v Qatar National Bank and QNB | "In CL-2024-000435, it appears from the Order of Mrs Justice Dias that correspondence was sent to the court, and witness statements were filed, citing authorities that do not exist and claiming that other authorities contained passages that they do not contain" Rt Hon. Dame Victoria Sharp |
| 11 | 6-Jun-2025 | R (Ayinde) v Haringey | “ It is such a professional shame. The submission was a good one. The medical evidence was strong. The ground was potentially good. Why put a fake case in?”“I should say it is the responsibility of the legal team, including the solicitors, to see that the statement of facts and grounds are correct.”“…I consider that it would have been negligent for this barrister, if she used AI and did not check it, to put that text into her pleading.”Mr Justice Richie |
| 12 | 18-Jun-2025 | UB v SoS for Home Department | “…recognised this seriousness of this issue and has taken commendable steps to ensure it will not be repeated including (i) meeting with the caseworker who drafted the Grounds; (ii) holding a partners’ meeting to discuss adopting an AI policy and assigning the task of finalising an AI policy to a colleague in consultation with an AI professional; (iii) conducting relevant in-house training and issuing interim AI Guidance and (iv) planning for comprehensive staff training by an AI professional….” |
| 13 | 20-Jun-2025 | Pro Health Solutions Ltd v ProHealth Inc (UKIPO, Appointed Person, BL O/0559/25) | "As identified in Ayinde (including in the Appendix setting out domestic and overseas examples of attempts to rely on fake citations), fabrication of citations can involve making up a case entirely, making up quotes and attributing them to a real case, and also making up a legal proposition and attributing it to a real case even though the case is not relevant to the legal proposition being made (for instance, it deals with a completely different issue or area of law). It is not, however, fabrication to make an honest mistake as to what a court held in a particular case or to be genuinely mistaken as to the effect of a court’s judgment. In any event, it does not matter whether fabrication was arrived at with or without the aid of generative artificial intelligence. I therefore need to consider what if any sanction is appropriate.” |
| 14 | 7-Jul-2025 | Various Leaseholders of Napier House v Assethold Ltd | “15. The Respondent included two cases within their grounds for appeal which have been cited as…[False Case names] Having performed a search on BAILLI, Westlaw and Find Case Law, it has not been possible to find …[False Case name]. It may be that this case is not authentic and AI may have been used to reference this case….”On another case, the court noted the decision concerned the circumstances in which a parole board should hold an oral hearing. “When reading the full judgment it is difficult to see why the tribunal has been referred to this case…..” |
| 15 | 27-Jul-2025 | HMRC v Gunnarsson [2025] UKUT 247 (TCC). | "113. In this case, HMRC was put to the trouble of having to investigate the existenceof the purported decisions relied upon by the Respondent. Fortunately, they did so.Depending on the circumstances, there may be occasions when the opposing party or24the tribunal are not able to discover the errors relied upon. There may be others wherean adjournment is required to investigate or address the inaccurate information.114. On these facts, we do not consider the Respondent to be highly culpable becausehe is not legally trained or qualified, not subject to the same duties as a regulated lawyeror other professional representative and may not have understood that the informationand submissions presented were not simply unreliable but fictitious. He was under timepressure given his other competing responsibilities and doing his best as a lay litigantseeking to assist the UT by preparing written submissions." |
| 16 | 30-Jul-2025 | Father v Mother [2025] EWHC 2135 (Fam) | “(16) The F then made a further application on a C2 asking that HHJ Bailey recuse herself on the basis of being biased against him and her not understanding ASD and the impacts of his diagnosis. This came before the Judge on 10 June 2025. In his written application to the court the F referred to a number of previous authorities, in particular relating to ASD. HHJ Bailey realised that many of these cases were not genuine, and the submission appeared to have been generated by Artificial Intelligence (“AI”). In light of the level of recent concern about litigants and lawyers using AI and referring to cases which are not genuine (as reflected in the Divisional Court decision R (Ayinde) v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1383), HHJ Bailey referred the case to me as the Family Presiding Judge for the Midlands.”“The F relied upon faked cases without apparently making any effort to check their veracity. It is in my view important to note that the F is someone who is well capable of checking references and ensuring documents are accurate if it is in his interests to do so.” |
| 17 | 12-Aug-2025 | Holloway v Beckles and Beckles | "That leaves the matter of the fake cases. The Tribunal finds that this does amount to unreasonable conduct within rule 13(1)(b). It has decided that the misconduct is serious, being conduct that undermines civil litigation in the Tribunal. Therefore, the Tribunal determines that it should "make a costs order. It considers that the costs order should be proportionate to the additional costs caused. It has decided that the appropriate quantum is half the costs of counsel’s fees in attending the hearing of 14 May 2025. These amount to £750 and must be paid to the applicant within 28 days." |
| 18 | 15-Aug-2025 | Kuzniar v General Dental Council Case No. 6009997/2024 | "44. The Claimant explained that the problems arose from her using AI to carry out research.She had previously used AI/ChatGP to carry out research without problems in her litigationagainst Roxdent Ltd and so she expected to be able to do so again successfully in theinstant case. She did not know about the problems with the citations when she told theRespondent’s solicitors about them, and when she found out about them, she did her bestwithin the short time available to mitigate or reduce the problem. She did not act in badfaith or with any intent to place false information before the Tribunal. I accept thisexplanation.45. The Claimant conducted the claim unreasonably as described above by referring to theRespondent a large number of nonsensical and in many cases non-existent citationswithout taking any or sufficient care to check them first. By not doing so she passed thework of checking them to the Respondent to have to do at short notice. My discretion toaward costs is engaged.46. However, I decline to award costs because AI is a relatively new tool which the public isstill getting used to, the Claimant acted honestly (and furthermore has presented her casehonestly to me over the last two days), and she tried to her best to rectify the situation assoon as she became aware of her mistake." |
| 19 | 29-Sep-2025 | ANPV & SAPV v SOSHD | “…suggested that the inaccuracies in the grounds were as a result of his drafting style. He accepted that there might have been some “confusion and vagueness” on his part; that he might “need to construct sentences in a more liberal way”; and that his drafting should perhaps “be a little more generous” when it came to making specific allegations about judges overlooking or failing to follow binding authorities. … The problems which I have detailed above are not matters of drafting style. The authorities which were cited in the grounds either did not exist or did not support the grounds of which were advanced. Where the cases did exist, they were often wholly irrelevant to the proposition of law which was given in the grounds.” (paragraphs 63 and 64) |
| 20 | 6-Oct-2025 | AK v SOSHD UI-2025-002981 | "What concerns me in this case is not merely that there were false citations in the grounds of appeal considered by Judge Saffer; it is that those false citations were then removed from the grounds of appeal which were placed in the composite bundle. The former actions are unprofessional, the latter are potentially dishonest because it suggests that there was an attempt to conceal the false citations..." |
| 21 | 10-Oct-2025 | Peters v Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency | “9. I raise this because: 9.1 An appreciable amount of hearing time was taken up with trying to obtain copies of various reports in order that respondent’s Counsel (and I) could check the accuracy of the AI generated summaries. 9.2 There was a significant risk I could have been misled had this not been done. 9.3 Because of the demonstrated inaccuracies, I was unable to rely on the summaries. 9.4 The delay involved also caused or contributed to my Judgment being reserved.”“…He is genuinely seeking to assist a claimant who would otherwise be unrepresented. Nonetheless, it is important that some basic checks are done to ensure that the material put before the Tribunal is accurate in order to avoid the above. I refer to R (on the application of Ayinde) v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1383 which clearly identifies the risk of not undertaking such checks and the importance of doing so…” |
| 22 | 13-Oct-2025 | Malathi Latha Sriram (Mukti Roy) v Louise Mary Brittain | “…rightly in my view, and I make no criticism of her. For what it is worth, I suspect, that, in common with many unrepresented parties, [Claimant] has resorted to research using the internet and has come up with false leads. The late Muir Hunter was an eminent member of the insolvency bar and the author for many years of an insolvency commentary that still bears his name. It is easy to see how his name could have come up in the course of an internet search and end up wrongly linked to a real case name and reference. The abbreviation BPIR stands for the Bankruptcy and Personal Insolvency Reports. They are not readily available to members of the public. It would have been difficult for [Claimant] to check the citation…” |
| 23 | 13-Oct-2025 | Hassan v ABC International Bank PLC | “On the use of AI in general, I happily accept that the internet is a resource many of us tend to rely on as providing expertise and knowledge where we lack it. Indeed, the facility for using a search engine has even been relied on in the EAT a reason for not granting an extension of time. I accept that AI is now at the forefront of internet searches. It might also be said that more intelligent and proficient users of the internet, like the Claimant, are more apt to use it in the way that the Claimant has i.e. to help construct arguments. I should not, and do not, approach the Claimant’s use of AI as in any way inherently negative” |
| 24 | 14-Oct-2025 | Ndaryiyumvire v Birmingham City University | 48. I do have to take account of the fact that, as was said in Ayinde, the use of AI is a large and growing problem and the citing of fictitious or fake authorities is a serious threat to the integrity of the justice system which depends upon courts being able to rely on lawyers putting before the courts, whether orally or in documents, accurate material and accurate statements of the law supported by genuine cases. Lawyers who cite fictitious cases must face serious consequences and in the current environment where this is a significant and growing problem, the guidance in Ayinde indicates that judges should take a fairly tough line. |
| 25 | 17-Oct-2025 | Lee v Blackpool B&B et al MAN/00EJ/HMG/2024/0011 | "...I can only conclude that the ‘decision’ submitted to the Tribunal is a fabrication – whether or not it is the product of the injudicious use of artificial intelligence tools is unclear.” |
| 26 | 23-Oct-2025 | Victoria Place et al v Assethold Limited | "85. I then typed the same wording into M365 Copilot on an Android device but adding a question mark at the end which gave a similar response, although the phrasing was markedly different, and it referred to the Upper Tribunal decision cited by [landlord’s managing agent] rather than the ‘hallucinated’ Court of Appeal citation. Repeating the same question sometime later would not re-produce reference to the Upper Tribunal decision, showing that AI adapts and an earlier answer may no longer be returned as the algorithm learns, demonstrating the care that needs to be taking in using AI. The idiom ‘shifting sands’ comes to mind.” |
| 27 | 4-Nov-2025 | Choksi v IPS Law LLP | "...contains references to a number of cases that have wrong citations, wrong names or which simply do not exist. A number of the cases cited are wholly irrelevant and do not support the proposition in support of which they are cited...” |
| 28 | 17-Nov-2025 | 133 Blackstock Road (Hackney) RTM Company Limited v Assethold Limited | “19.The Tribunal is extremely concerned that the Respondent has put material before it that is erroneous. [redacted] has failed to give any explanation as to how this error arose. One explanation mightbe the use of an AI LLM in the production of the Respondent’s statement of case. |
| 29 | 21-Nov-2025 | Appeal in the cause of Jennings v Natwest Group Plc (Sheriff Appeal Court Civil) | “[10] These require caution, the appellant having made submissions using ChatGPT, an artificial-intelligence database (see appellant’s supplementary submission). That may explain the generality of the submissions, which largely comprise free-form legal propositions with only limited link to the facts. It has served to complicate and obscure the true analysis of the issues. At least three of the cases cited appear to be non-existent.” |
| 30 | 24-Nov-2025 | Oxford Hotel Investments Limited v Great Yarmouth Borough Council | “…purported to quote at a little length from [18] of the judgment to the effect that a microwave satisfied the statutory definition. The problem is that the real [18] of Barker v Shokar says no such thing. Nor does any other part of the judgment in that case. [Director for the Appellant] ended up accepting that this misleading use of authority was the product of AI. It is one which illustrates again, in courts and tribunals, the dangers of using AI for legal research without any checks.” |
| 31 | 3-Dec-2025 | Wemimo Mercy Taiwo v Homelets of Bath Limited & Ors | “…This case does not exist (albeit the bogus reference can be ‘recreated’ through Google’s AI Overview function). There is a 2016 case in the Bolton County Court between the two named parties, but there was no appeal in 2018 to the Court of Appeal and [redacted] is a false reference |
| 32 | 8-Dec-2025 | S Peggie v Fife Health Board and Dr B Upton | Details TBC |
| 33 | 9-Dec-2025 | D (A Child) (Recusal) | “Finally, I return to the issue raised by the father’s representatives about the mother’s erroneous citation of authority (see in particular paragraph 54 above). I absolve the mother of any intention to mislead the court. Litigants in person are in a difficult position putting forward legal arguments. It is entirely understandable that they should resort to artificial intelligence for help. Used properly and responsibly, artificial intelligence can be of assistance to litigants and lawyers when preparing cases. But it is not an authoritative or infallible body of legal knowledge. There are a growing number of reports of “hallucinations” infecting legal arguments through the citation of cases for propositions for which they are not authority and, in some instances, the citation of cases that do not exist at all. At worst, this may lead to the other parties and the court being misled. In any event, it means that extra time is taken and costs are incurred in cross-checking and correcting the errors. All parties – represented and unrepresented – owe a duty to the court to ensure that cases cited in legal argument are genuine and provide authority for the proposition advanced.” |
| 34 | 8-Jan-2026 | Elden v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 41 (TC) | 93. In further submissions, the Representative said 'The suggestion that citing a published authority amounts to providing false material is misconceived. A court decision is a matter of public record. Whether a case applies is a matter of legal argument and opinion, not misrepresentation. It is entirely proper for parties to put forward different interpretations for the Tribunal to consider. To characterise this as "false material" is both unfounded and inappropriate.' It is not clear who the representative is quoting as saying false material was used. The wording used by HMRC was 'inaccurate use of AI/inaccurate authorities'. |
